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International Implications
of Limitations on
"Aggregate Concentration"
DAVID BOIES

Traditionally, antitrust laws have been concerned with
competition and concentration within a single market. In the past few years,
however, increasing attention has been given to economywide or aggregate
concentration-especially when such concentration is accomplished by
merger rather than by internal growth. In 1979 and 1980, Congress considered Senate Bill S. 600 which would limit mergers based on size criteria
that are unrelated, at least directly, to proof of a lessening of competition
within any given market.' The international implications of applying this
principle are complex and difficult, and have yet to be fully addressed. It is
the purpose of this article to articulate the contours of this area of emerging
importance.

AGGREGATE CONCENTRATION

The term concentration, as it traditionally has been used in the antitrust
area, has usually referred to concentration within a particular product or
geographic market-concentration in the steel industry, the computer industry, the automobile industry, or the drug industry. Traditionally, that has

been the sole focus of the antitrust laws with respect to concentration. Yet
there is another sense in which economists and legislators (and to some
extent, antitrust lawyers) talk about concentration-concentration in an economywide sense or aggregate concentration as it is referred to by some

economists. 2 Aggregate concentration is not a measure of the extent to which
a particular company or group of companies controls a specific market share
of a given industry; rather it refers to the concentration of the entire economy
in the hands of a limited number of corporations.3 When used in that sense,
concentration of industry within the United States has increased significantly by most measures.
Mr. Boies is a member of the New York Bar and former chief counsel and staff
director, Senate Judiciary Committee.
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RECENT INCREASES

IN

AGGREGATE CONCENTRATION

In 1955 the top 500 manufacturing corporations in the United States controlled aproximately 65 percent of all the manufacturing and mining assets in
the United States.4 Only ten years later, in 1965, the top 500 manufacturing
and mining corporations controlled somewhat over 70 percent of those
assets, 5 and by 1977 the percentage of all manufacturing and mining assets
controlled by the top 500 corporations had increased to over 80 percent6--an
increase in concentration of nearly 34 percent in twenty-two years. This is a
phenomenon with which the antitrust laws have not been traditionally concerned; it is, however, a phenomenon that many in Congress and elsewhere
believe to be a serious economic, social, and political problem entirely apart
from the incidence of concentration within particular markets.
If in this country 100 companies each had only 1 percent of each market
but together controlled the entire manufacturing sector of the economy, most
people would be viscerally troubled, even though, from a traditional antitrust
standpoint, the markets might be said to be rather deconcentrated since 100
companies were actively competing in each of the markets. 7 Though this
exact scenario is improbable, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates that
by the year 2000 a few hundered international corporations will control 54
percent of the worldwide manufacturing, mining, and service income and
assets.' Thus there is a demonstrable trend toward very substantial aggregate
concentration in the United States and, if the Chamber of Commerce's forecasts are correct, on a worldwide basis as well.9

EFFECTS OF INCREASED CONCENTRATION

As the economy becomes more concentrated, the number of independent
businesses declines. This loss of diversity can limit the choices available to
consumers and stunt the process of growth through innovation. Moreover, the
loss of diversity has economic effects. As conglomerates acquire companies
that were formerly independent, a new layer of business bureaucracy is imposed on the acquired companies, which results in a marked increase in
intracorporate bureaucratic review, and the number of independent decisionmaking centers is reduced. Moreover, applying to economic affairs the principle of federalism that innovation and experimentation are promoted by the
dispersion rather than the concentration of decision-making power, these characteristic objectives of the free enterprise system would be impeded. Further,
a loss of corporate independence may adversely affect company-community
and employer-employee relations as absentee management becomes0 increasingly distant and isolated from employee and community interests.'
Particularly in considering the scale on which mergers are taking place
today, economic concentration and the loss of diversity can have significant
social and political implications as well as economic effects. One of the per-
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ceptible trends over the last five years, and in some respects a healthy trend,
has been the increasing political activity of business political action committees, or PACs. Corporate executives may play a proper role in political and
election activities by establishing and contributing to a PAC which then acts as
effectively as the corporation's political arm. 11 There were about 700 corporate
lobbies registered in 1978.12 If the resources and actitivities of those 700
groups were suddenly concentrated in seventy, or in seven, the concomitant
loss of diversity of political opinion and the concentration of political power is
something that would be very troubling in any society, but particularly in the
United States, which prides itself on diversity and political, social, and economic democracy.13
Apart from the effect on organized political activity, large corporations
have profound effects on our society-the tastes we acquire, the activities
that are encouraged or discouraged, the attitudes that are advertised or attacked, the products and services that are offered or discontinued, the charities and public activities that are supported or starved for funds. Only the
most naive among us would suggest that in these areas large corporations are
guided and controlled wholly by the "invisible hand" of the marketplace.
How much discretion large corporations have in exercising their power is
debatable-but there is no doubt that they have significant influence. 14 It is
an article of democratic faith that such discretionary power is best when it is
dispersed and most troubling when it is concentrated in a few hands, however benign.
THE EFFECT OF MERGERS ON AGGREGATE CONCENTRATION

Mergers of large enterprises have contributed significantly to the level of
industrial concentration. In 1975 there were fourteen mergers with a value
in excess of 100 million dollars. In 1977 there were forty-one such mergers;
in 1978 there were eighty such mergers; and in 1979 at least ninety such
mergers were consummated. 5
There are various ways to measure changes in the level of industrial
concentration. Whether concentration is greater today than it was five years
ago or ten years ago depends to some extent on what figures are used. 16 It is
nonetheless clear that U.S. enterprise is more highly concentrated than it
would have been in the absence of the recent merger activity.
There may, of course, be economic and social benefits from the process
that lead to increased industrial size. This is particularly so where the increases in size result from the internal growth of successful firms.' 7 Growth
may encourage firms to reduce their prices, improve their product, and generally serve consumers more effectively. Tampering with such an incentive is
particularly dubious in a time when a priority concern of the country is its
apparent long-run inability to sustain increased productivity.
There are also important benefits that can be obtained from growth
through merger-such as economies of scale, strengthening of competitors,
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and transfer of technology. 8 However, there are many mergers-including
many of the largest mergers-where such justifications are weak, if they are
19
a product of tax planning,
pertinent at all. Many large mergers are more
2
20
accounting and stock market considerations, and corporate empire building '
than they are a product of economic rationales that serve consumer interests.
This is particularly true of so-called conglomerate acquisitions that, by definition, involve companies in unrelated markets, and therefore are less likely to
result in economies of scale or other efficiencies common to related market
mergers.

PROBLEMS UNDER THE EXISTING LAW

Congress first started to address the issue of conglomerate acquisitions in the
late 1960s and early 1970s. At the confirmation hearings for Assistant Attorney General McLaren, the Senate Judiciary Committee received a'commitment that large conglomerate mergers would be attacked by the Justice
Department under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 22 And a few months later,
of Ling-Temcosuch a suit was commenced to bar the proposed merger
23
Vought and the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation.
The Justice Department's activity in this area, however, has met with
little success. For example, from 1974 through 1978, twelve conglomerate
mergers were challenged in court; the government lost all twelve cases. 24
The failure of the Justice Department to prevent such mergers under existing antitrust laws underscored the inadequacy of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act; it focuses solely on concentration within a "line of commerce." 25 If the
trend toward aggregate concentration is to be halted, new legislation must be
enacted to constrain conglomerate merger activity.2 ' Accordingly, throughout
the last decade, Congress intensively studied this problem, holding hearings
27
on conglomerate mergers, the related topic of multinational corporations,
28
and on specific concentrated industries, most notably the oil industry.

THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION: S. 600

One piece of legislation to come out of this congressional inquiry is the Small
Business Protection Act of 1979 (the Act), Senate Bill S. 600, which was
introduced in 1979 by Senator Edward Kennedy. The bill imposes limitations
on mergers based on the size of the participating corporations, irrespective of
the consequences of those mergers within a particular market. The basic
purpose of the bill is to impose threshold size limitations on changes in
concentration through mergers regardless of whether the increase in concentration is economywide or within a particular market.
The bill recognizes, however, that some mergers might enhance economic efficiency. Accordingly, except for the very largest mergers, in which
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case it is presumed that further concentration of economic power cannot be
justified on any grounds, the bill provides the acquiring companies with
potential affirmative defenses.
The bill has three separate prohibitory sections. Section 2(a) completely
prohibits the merger or consolidation of any two companies when each has
assets or sales exceeding $2 billion. No affirmative defenses are available
when the merger or consolidation reaches these proportions. It is important
to note, however, that this is not an absolute limitation on corporate size. It
only limits industrial giants from making huge leaps in size by combining
with another industrial giant. Expansion through internal growth is not
hindered since the bill only addresses merger activity.
Section 2(b) prohibits mergers or consolidations between companies
when each has assets or annual sales in excess of $350 million. Section 2(c)
is a combination of traditional antitrust principles and the new aggregate
concentration concept. It prohibits mergers when one company has assets or
sales exceeding $250 million and the other company has 20 percent or more
of the sales in any significant market during the calendar year immediately
preceding the acquisition.
For mergers covered by Sections 2(b) and 2(c), the bill now provides
three independent affirmative defenses. The acquisition may occur if: (1) its
preponderant effect is to enhance competition substantially, or (2) substantial efficiencies will result,29 or (3) the parties divest themselves, within one
year, of assets equal to or greater than those acquired.
To discourage the sort of aggressive acquisition programs which ran
rampant in the last decade, the bill provides that these affirmative defenses
are not available if either party to the transaction has, within the past year,
been a party to another transaction that was within Section 2(b) or 2(c).
The purpose of the legislation is to prohibit those mergers that have an
undesirable impact on increasing industrial concentration, yet permit those
mergers that either increase efficiencies or enhance competition. The provision allowing for the spin-off of comparable assets permits a company to
acquire a particular corporation under circumstances that would otherwise
be barred, as long as it does not increse concentration in the aggregate sense.

INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF S. 600

Studying the international impact of the application of this legislation, one
encounters the same difficulties that occur in other antitrust contexts 0 Analytically, the international aspects of U.S. concentration regulation fall into
two broad areas. First, to what extent should the application of those concentration principles be relaxed in favor of foreign corporations or foreign entities
as a result of jurisdictional and comity issues or related concerns? 3 ' Second,
to what extent should the principles that we might otherwise want to apply
in the United States be modified by recognizing the realities of the worldwide
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market conditions in which our corporations must compete? In its present
form, S. 600 addresses the first of these questions and concludes that there
should be no lesser standard for foreign corporations.
A few examples will serve to illustrate the sort of problems that might
arise. Suppose a large conglomerate acquisition is proposed in the United
States: Mobil Oil Company seeks to acquire Marcor, a company. with more
than $350 million but less than $2 billion in assets or sales. Section 2(b) of S.
600 would limit, but not necessarily prohibit, this type of merger. If the
corporations could demonstrate some economies of scale or substantial enhancement of competition resulting from the merger, the merger would be
allowed; but given the circumstances of this hypothetical merger, it is probable neither can be demonstrated. Accordingly, we can assume that this
merger would be precluded by the application of the anticonglomerate
merger bill. Should or would the bill similarly prohibit a foreign giant, such
as British Petroleum, from acquiring Marcor? The answer to that question
lies in another question: To what extent does it make sense to impose this
type of restriction on U.S. companies if it would be permissible for a foreign
company with no U.S. assets to enter the United States and effect the otherwise prohibited purchase of Marcor? In other words, is it desirable to prevent
U.S. companies that compete in the United States from acquiring other U.S.
companies if the result is simply
to have those U.S. companies available for
32
sale to foreign corporations?
The authors of S. 600 concluded that if a U.S. company had assets or
sales in excess of the $350 million jurisdictional threshold amount, then the
acquisition of that company ought to be subject to the constraints of the
statute whether the acquiring company was inside or outside the United
States. Therefore, if a foreign corporation, even one that has no assets in the
United States, sought to acquire Marcor, that acquisition would be covered
by the legislation whenever the foreign corporation had the requisite jurisdictional amount of assets anywhere in the world.
Two major concerns argue for this approach. First, it means that U.S.
companies and foreign companies are to be treated similarly when they seek
to acquire a U.S. concern except when jurisdictional or comity considerations are paramount. Second, the statute seeks to prevent the aggregation of
assets by regulating the acquisition of U.S. corporations, irrespective of the
identity of the acquirer. In this way, the purpose of the legislation is broader
than the means. Since the principle underlying the legislation is to prevent
the kind of loss of diversity and loss of independence that occurs with the
conversion of an independent corporation into a subsidiary or a division of
another corporation, both the purposes and the jurisdictional basis of the
statute are met regardless of whether the acquiring corporation is a U.S.
corporation or a foreign corporation.
A second, more difficult problem, is whether antitrust officials should
regulate the acquisition of a foreign corporation by a U.S. corporation; that is,
where a U.S. company acquires a foreign company with no assets in the
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United States and both companies have the requisite jurisdictional asset
value. As presently drafted, the legislation would apply to the acquisition
abroad by a U.S. company even though the acquired foreign company does
not have the requisite jurisdictional amount of assets in the United States,
but does have sufficient assets in its worldwide operation.
This result is troubling to those persons concerned with the legislation.
Yet it would be difficult to exempt such acquisitions as a practical matter and
still be able to enforce the ban against the acquisition of U.S. companies by
foreign companies. First, this sort of discrimination in favor of U.S. companies might cause serious diplomatic problems. Foreign governments have
become increasingly sensitive about U.S. interference with the acquisition
policies of their domestic firms.33 Their attitude is understandable. For years
other nations have watched U.S. firms profit by investment abroad. By acquiring existing firms in foreign markets, U.S. firms have increased their
worldwide presence. In light of this, foreign governments would be offended
by a statute that created restrictions on acquisitions of American firms by
foreign companies, but had no restrictions on foreign acquisitions by U.S.
finns.34 Second, excluding acquisitions of foreign companies from the bill's
coverage would tend to drive U.S. capital abroad, a result which certainly
should be avoided.
A third and critical reason to include such transactions in the bill is the
practical problem of making sure all domestic acquisitions are covered. If
foreign acquisitions are exempted, it might permit companies to structure
their acquisitions to avoid the clear intent of the bill. Corporate lawyers
would simply arrange the transaction so that the acquired corporation was
always a foreign entity; the intent of the bill would thus be nullified. It
would be possible for the courts to attempt to make a factual determination
of who is the acquirer and who is the acquired company, but that would be
a difficult task and would still present the problems raised by the issue of
discrimination.
Whether this legislation should apply to merger activity between two
companies when neither company has the requisite jurisdictional amount of
assets within the United States is one of the most difficult questions facing
the Congress. The question remains open. It will be the focus of considerable
discussion and debate during the markup sessions that will occur throughout
1980, and presumably during the next Congress, at which time this legislation will probably reach the floor of the Senate and the House.3
A different, but equally difficult question is the extent to which foreign
competitive effects can or should be taken into account in providing the
affirmative defenses of enhancement of competition, economies of scale, or
other efficiencies. On the one hand, it is desirable to have symmetry when
applying the same principles in both foreign and domestic contexts. On the
other hand, the bill is primarily a domestic statute with particular concerns
about U.S. concentration and the benefits of competition and efficiencies
within the United States. This too is an issue that remains unresolved.
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LIMITATIONS ON LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS

These are areas in which it is much easier to raise questions than it is to
formulate solutions. The same is true in the area referred to earlier-the
extent to which U.S. antitrust authorities should take into account the effects
of enforcing U.S. antitrust laws against U.S. corporations in the international
market. One might conclude that the ideal of our antitrust laws is a competitive model that should be applied not only in the United States but outside
the United States as well. Congress, however, lacks the power to impose that
competitive model on the rest of the world,3" and many nations have embraced monopoly rather than competition as a model for industrial growth.37
Given the fact that this competitive model cannot be imposed on the rest of
the world and that competition in the worldwide market continues to increase, to what extent should United States antitrust laws continue to be
applied to the maximum extent possible in an attempt to bring this country
closer to that competitive model? To put it differently, to what extent must
United States antitrust and enforcement policies be modified in recognition
of the kind of international conditions that face our domestic corporations? 38
A couple of illustrations will be helpful. The first relates to the concern of
traditional antitrust laws with intramarket concentration; the second relates
to aggregate concentration that would be regulated by Senate Bill S. 600.
Consider first a U.S. company that seeks to acquire a foreign manufacturer
in a related business-to take a specific fact situation, if Gillette in the United
States wishes to acquire Braun, a German producer of electric shavers. 39 In40
making the decision whether this acquisition violates U.S. antitrust law,
should the inquiry be tempered by the probability that if the Gillette acquisition is prohibited, another foreign shaver producer will make the acquisition;
or must the focus of scrutiny be limited to the particular transaction in
question and its domestic economic effect?4 If attention is directed only to
the particular transaction, it may be concluded that the merger would inhibit
actual competition, at least in some broad market, or might prohibit potential
competition since the two companies may enter into each other's more narrow markets. And if the world was controlled uniformly by the U.S. antitrust
laws, it might very well be concluded that the hypothetical merger should be
stopped (although in the facts of the proposed case this author has some
42
doubt). Such a conclusion was in fact made by U.S. enforcement authorities
(but tempered by the consent decree) in a case involving Gillette.
On the other hand, if the German shaving company is not acquired by
Gillette, it may still be acquired by some large foreign shaver manufacturer
with an equal effect on competition not only outside the United States but
inside the United States as well. That acquisition is likely to be beyond the
traditional reach of U.S. antitrust laws either for jurisdictional or comity reasons. In that case, it is not clear that U.S. antitrust laws should be applied to a
foreign acquisition by a U.S. company (and therefore, within our jurisdiction),
if the alternative is simply to have the acquisition occur between another
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foreign company with equal or perhaps even greater impact on competition
43
when compared with the impact of an acquisition by the U.S. company.
The second example is even more difficult. Consider U.S. companies
that operate in a concentrated U.S. industry (such as the drug, steel, or
automobile industry) but also compete against foreign companies in international markets. Does it make sense from the U.S. antitrust standpoint to
enforce deconcentration laws against U.S. corporations without looking at
the extent to which those rules affect companies as they compete outside of
the United States, confront larger international markets and foreign corporations, and deal with foreign governments that appear to favor concentration
within particular industries? Government policies that favor high levels of
concentration are much more firmly established in Europe and Japan than
they are in the United States. When formulating U.S. antitrust policy, such
as S. 600, a serious issue is whether, and to what extent, the international or
non-U.S. circumstances surrounding major U.S. industries (including the
major industries that are most concentrated in the United States) can or
should be ignored. That is, how does U.S. antitrust policy take into account
the realization that U.S. corporations must compete in an international environment and compete against companies that have different incentives, different motivations, and different domestic controls in their home countries.

CONCLUSION

None of these problems can be easily or precisely resolved. Unfortunately,
most of them seem to rest on factual circumstances that are peculiar to
individual cases and result in ad hoc determinations, although that raises
problems not only for foreign countries and corporations, but for U.S. companies as well. It is an area where a certain amount of vagueness is desirable,
so as to allow the courts to operate flexibly within a broad framework of
national policy, on a case by case basis, and flesh out the details of U.S.
policy by implementing it in the most principled and reasonable fashion.44
However, a certain amount of predictability, that would attend a more precise
codification by statute, is also needed. Congress will be attempting to balance
these two competing and to a large extent conflicting desires, both with
respect to the conglomerate merger legislation, which is a new effort in the
area of the control of concentration, and with respect to conventional antitrust laws as they affect international events or as international events and
issues affect the application of those laws in the United States.
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are explicitly intended or reasonably
foreseeable, and the extent to which
enforcement action can reasonably
be expected to achieve compliance.
This jurisdictionalrule of reason, or
balancingtest, is a commonsense
rule and, of course, states may differ
in theirjudgments of how it should
be applied in a given instance. The
internationallegal obligation is...
to consider these interests in good
faith and, where appropriatein light
of all circumstances, to temper the
exercise of enforcement jurisdiction.
Hearings on the Energy Antimonopoly Act of 1979, H.R. 4295 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7 (1979) (Department of State Print). Cf. Hansen, The
Enforcement of the United States Antitrust Laws by the Department of
Justice to Protect Freedom of United
States Foreign Trade, 11 ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION 75 (1957).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Standard
Oil Co., 1970 TRADE CASES, 72,988
(N.D. Ohio 1969) (consent decree).
33. The Antitrust Division concluded
early on that acquisitions of American firms should be treated no differently when the acquiring firm is a
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foreign national. See Wall St. J., Nov.
18, 1969, at 3, col. 1 (quoting
Richard McLaren, then Asst. Att'y
Gen'l, Antitrust Div.).
34. E.

KINTNER & M. JOELSON, AN

profits to fluctuate through the
forces of competition.
[Id. at 7.1
39. See, e.g., Baker, Antitrust and World
Trade: Tempest in an International

Teapot, 8

INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER

119 (1974).
35. Analogous problems are raised by
the proposed Energy Antinonopoly
Act of 1979, S. 1246, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S. 6703
(1979). See, e.g., Amendment to S.
1246 Proposed by the Department of
Justice, Letter to Senator Edward M.
Kennedy from John H. Shenefield,
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division (September 18, 1979). Reprinted in Annex 2, infra.
36. Limitations on the power, size and
structureof the supranationalfirm
may ultimately be imposed through
worldwide uniform standards developed by the United Nations or a similar multinationalbody, but until
agreement is reached on the natureor
desirabilityof such control,the burden
of regulation will continue to fall on
those states that assert domesticjurisdiction over the firms involved.
Graham, Hermann & Marcus, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Mergers
Involving Foreign Interests,23 STAN.

U.S.

DEP'T

15
(1977), with Griffin, A Critique of
the Justice Department's Antitrust
Guide for InternationalOperations,
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

11
41.

42.

43.

Reflections on Recent OECD Activities: Regulation of Multinational
Corporate Conduct and Structure,
post; Kurek, Supranational Regulation of Transnational Corporations:
The UNCTAD and CTC Efforts, post.
37. Scott & Yablonski, Transnational
Mergers and Joint Ventures Affecting American Exports 14 ANTITRUST 44.
BULL. 1 (1969).

DIVISION,

L.J. 16, 27

OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR

L. REV. 205 (1971); See Stockmann,

38. The whole economic structure of
other countries may be dependent on
cartel or joint efforts-as in vital industries where the foreign government is reluctant to allow prices and

CORNELL INT'L

(1974).
40. Cf. ANTITRUST

CORNELL INT'L

L.J. 215, 230-33

(1978).
This possibility is becoming a reality
with increasing frequency:
[A] growing merger trend within
Western Europe's own business organizationsmay be preempting the
investment opportunitiesavailable
to United States firms desirous of
establishingor enlargingbeachheads
overseas.
Scott & Yablonski, supra note 37, at
2.
United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F.
Supp. 713 (D. Mass. 1975) (consent
decree).
When the antitrust laws are applied to
foreign transactions, two distinct domestic concerns must be considered:
The first is American industries' interest in competitive access to world
markets. The second is the American
consumer's interest in having access
to foreign goods and the competitive
forces they engender. Both of these
interests would.be jeopardized if enforcement authorities in the United
States ignored this possibility.
A case-by-case approach may help
ensure fairness in individual cases,
see note 30, supra, but codification
of easily understood standards affords certainty to business transactions and reduces problems of enforcement.
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ANNEX 1: SENATE BILL S. 600

S. 600

96TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

To preserve the diversity and independence of American business.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

March 8 (legislative day, February 22), 1979
Mr. Kennedy (for himself, Mr. Metzenbaum, Mr. Pressler, Mr. Melcher, and
Mr. McGovern) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
A BILL

To preserve the diversity and independence of American business.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the
"Small and Independent Business Protection Act of 1979".
SEC. 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall
merge or consolidate with any other person engaged in commerce, or acquire, directly or indirectly, such amount of the stock or other share capital of
such other person as to enable such person to control such other person, or
acquire, directly or indirectly, a majority of the assets of such other person,
if(a) each person has assets or sales exceeding $2,000,000,000;
(b) each person has assets or sales exceeding $350,000,000; or
(c) one person has assets or sales exceeding $350,000,000 and the
other person has 20 per centum or more of the sales during the calendar
year immediately preceding the acquisition in any significant market.
SEC. 3. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), it shall be an affirmative
defense to an offense under sections 2(b) and 2(c) that(1) the transaction will have the preponderant effect of substantially enhancing competition;
(2) the transaction will result in substantial efficiencies; or
(3) within one year before or after the consummation of the transaction, the parties thereto shall have divested one or more viable business units, the assets and revenues of which are equal to or greater
than the assets and revenues of the smaller party to the transaction.
(b) Such affirmative defense shall not be available if one of the
parties to the transaction has within one year previous to the transaction been a party to a prior transaction coming within the provisions of
section 2(b) or 2(c).
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SEC. 4. (a) Authority to enforce compliance with section 2 is vested in the
Attorney General of the United States and the Federal Trade Commission.
(b) The Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission shall
adopt procedures by which parties to a transaction within the terms of sections 2(b) and 2(c) can ascertain the determination of the Attorney General
or the Federal Trade Commission as to whether or not the transaction is
within the terms of any of the affirmative defenses set forth in section 3. If
the Attorney General or Commission, pursuant to such procedures, advises a
party that a transaction is within the terms of any of the affirmative defenses
set forth in section 3, the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission shall be barred by such advice in the absence of proof that the determination was based in whole or substantial part on an intentional misstatement
by the party requesting such advice.
SEC. 5. Injunctive relief for private parties may be granted under the
same terms and conditions as prescribed by section 16 of the Clayton Act.
Definitions
SEC. 6. (a) As used herein, "efficiencies" shall include economies of scale
in manufacturing, marketing, distribution, and research and development.
(b) As used herein, "significant market" means any line of commerce
in any section of the country which has annual sales of more than
$100,000,000.
SEC. 7. (a) The provisions of this Act are in addition to and not in lieu of
other provisions of the antitrust laws and nothing in this Act shall be deemed
to authorize or make lawful anything heretofore prohibited or made illegal by
other antitrust laws.
(b) This Act shall apply to all mergers or consolidations occurring after
March 11, 1979.
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ANNEX 2: SHENEFIELD LETTER RE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF
SENATE BILL S. 1246

September 18, 1979; letter from John H. Shenefield, assistant attorney general, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice to Senator Edward M.
Kennedy, chairman, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, re: International Implications of S.1246, the Energy Antimonopoly Act of 1979.

Honorable Edward M. Kennedy
Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
As you know, the Administration has indicated its support for S. 1246,
the Energy Antimonopoly Act of 1979, as it would be amended by proposals
forwarded to the Committee under cover of my letter to you of July 31, 1979.
As thus amended, S. 1246 would -restrict large acquisitions by major American petroleum producers and their "affiliates", the latter being defined to
include all companies controlling, controlled by, or under common control
with, major producers. Restrictions on acquisitions by affiliates are intended
to eliminate the possibility that revenues of major producers might be channeled through such companies to make acquisitions, resulting in evasion of
the purposes of the statute. Channeling major producers' revenues away
from acquisitions of unrelated firms toward investment in energy production
and development is a major goal of the bill.
Concern has arisen, however, over the possible international ramifications of legislation that at least on its face would restrict acquisitions by all
foreign companies affiliated in some way with major American producers.
This concern is amplified by the fact that the bill as amended by the Administration's proposals would restrict acquisitions by major producers and their
affiliates of foreign, as well as domestic, companies. It is argued that national
jurisdictional limits would be exceeded by such legislation, principles of international comity would be violated, and foreign sovereigns offended, perhaps resulting in retaliatory action to the detriment of energy production
abroad. While these concerns might be somewhat ameliorated by clear legislative history to the effect that invocation of the statute would be tempered by
jurisdictional and comity considerations, we believe that further amendments
clarifying its proper scope would be desirable.
The "foreign affiliate" question may be divided into two issues: (1) coverage of acquisitions by foreign firms that control major American producers,
and the other subsidiaries of such foreign firms, and (2) coverage of acquisi-
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tions by foreign firms which are themselves controlled by major American
producers.
(1) Acquisitions by Foreign Firms Controlling Major American
Producers And Other Subsidiaries of Such Foreign Firms
Applying the restrictions of S. 1246 to foreign firms that control major
American producers, and the other subsidiaries of those foreign firms, appears to raise the more difficult issues. The problems are not merely theoretical; two of the 18 major American producers covered by S. 1246 as it would
be amended by the Administration's proposals, Standard Oil of Ohio and
Shell, are controlled by foreign firms. Asserting jurisdiction over foreign
firms involves considerations not encountered in wholly domestic contexts.
Differing national interests and policies must be accommodated in both legislative and judicial processes, and connections with American interests identified. Here, covering acquisitions by foreign parents and sister subsidiaries
would not appear to be appropriate if acquisitions by such firms would not be
likely as a general matter to adversely affect legitimate American interests
that the bill is designed to protect. We are unable to conclude-with the
confidence desirable to assert jurisdiction over foreign firms-that foreign
parents would be likely to use major producers' revenues to make acquistions
to such an extent as to seriously undercut a major goal of the bill. Thus, from
both the jurisdictional and comity standpoints, coverage of such foreign company acquisitions is of doubtful propriety, and the Administration's proposal
was not intended to be applied in such situations.
Foreign parents and sister subsidiaries of major American producers (as
well as foreign governments) may, however, reasonably argue that technical
coverage of their acquisitions by S. 1246 is objectionable. They may argue
that international jurisdictional or comity precedent is not adequate to protect
against assertion of U.S. jurisdiction in excess of its proper bounds. They
may also fear the development of a cloud on the legality of proposed acquisitions despite general assurances to the contrary in legislative history or from
enforcement authorities.
These considerations have led us to conclude that it probably would be
wise to further amend S. 1246 to eliminate coverage of foreign firms that
control major American producers, and the other subsidiaries of such foreign
firms. Practically speaking, eliminating coverage of such firms would not
appear to interfere with the goals of the legislation. Wholesale transfer of
funds to foreign parents (other than transfers in the ordinary course of business such as normal dividend and interest payments) seems unlikely in view
of the fact that only two of the producers covered by the bill presently have
foreign parents and there is significant minority ownership of the American
producer in each instance. Evasion through such use of a foreign parent as
an acquiring medium seems unlikely; should a foreign parent acquire a firm
that could not be acquired by a major American producer, and then attempt
to convey such firm to the American producer-perhaps arguing the applica-
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bility of the intraenterprise exception in the bill-the entire series of transactions would rightly be viewed as an indirect acquisition by the American
producer. Creation of whole cloth foreign parents by other American producers to evade the statute also would be unavailing; acquisitions through
such schemes clearly would be indirect acquisitions by the producer, and
fully subject to the new law.
In light of these considerations, we are submitting herewith minor modifications to the Administration's proposed amendments to S. 1246 that would
eliminate coverage of foreign firms that control major American producers,
and the other subsidiaries of such firms. The definition of "affiliate" would be
altered to include only firms that are "controlled by" such major producers.
Attached is an appropriately altered draft of S. 1246 as it would be amended
by the Administration's proposals.
(2) Acquisitions by Foreign Firms Controlled by American Producers
With perhaps less force, it has been argued that acquisitions by domiciliaries of other countries should not be covered by the proposed legislation
regardless of their control by major American producers. The argument is
most forcefully advanced in hypothetical contexts in which foreign law or
policy arguably prompts, if not mandates, acquisitions otherwise within the
technical proscriptions of the bill.
Wholesale exemption of acquisitions by foreign subsidiaries of major
American producers clearly appears inappropriate. First, a broad statutory
exemption could seriously undercut the goals of the legislation by opening
avenues of foreign acquisition opportunities which could divert significant
major producer revenues from increased energy production. A direct connection between acquisitions by foreign subsidiaries of major American producers and the legitimate interests of this country is thus reasonably likely,
and supports the exercise of jurisdiction over the activities of such foreign
firms in many circumstances.*
Second, a broad statutory exemption is unnecessary, since principles of
international law and comity may lead to the conclusion that a particular
acquisition by a foreign firm which is controlled by a major American producer is not proscribed, notwithstanding its technical coverage by the bill.
Foreign laws and policies would be taken into full account in applying the
statute, as would the extent to which the particular acquisition in question
would be inconsistent with the purposes of the legislation. For example,
where an acquisition by a foreign subsidiary of a major producer of another
* It should be noted here that under the terms of the draft statute, challenges to
acquisitions by foreign subsidiaries of major American producers may be made
through suit against the foreign firm itself, where grounds for the exercise of jurisdiction over the foreign firm exist, or through suit against the major American producer
which is making the acquisition indirectly, or both. Effective enforcement of the bill
will not necessarily require naming as a defendant a foreign affiliate through which an
acquisition is being made.
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foreign firm is in full accord with expressed public interests of the foreign
nation (perhaps including interests in increased energy producton), even
though the acquisition is not mandated in the strict legal sense, comity may
compel deference to those interests. By way of further example, it may be
possible in some circumstances to be confident that a merger of a foreign
subsidiary of a major producer with another foreign firm does not entail any
drain on the producer's revenues, is instead supported entirely by the resources of the foreign firms involved, and would enhance the competitiveness of the resulting firm to the clear benefit of foreign public policies. Since
application of the statute in the international context depends in part on the
extent to which an acquistion would interfere with the goals of the bill, here
too, principles of international law and comity-that will be applied by the
courts and in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion as well-may render
application of the new statute inappropriate. If further assurance is needed
that the principles of international law and comity are to be applied by the
courts and prosecutors alike, we would have no objection to the statute, on
its face, providing that "This section's applicability to foreign acquisitions
shall be interpreted in accordance with the principles of international law
and comity."
Thus, there does not appear to be sufficient reason to create any broad
statutory exemption for acquisitions by foreign subsidiaries of major American producers. Reasoned decision-making with regard to application of the
statute to such acquisitions should provide safeguards against international
friction on the one hand and evasion of the statute's goals on the other....
Sincerely yours,
John H. Shenefield
Assistant Attorney General
Antitrust Division
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Proposed Amendment to S. 1246, Acquisitions by Major Oil CompaniesProposed New Section 7B of the Clayton Act
(a) No major producer engaged in commerce, or affiliate thereof, shall,
directly or indirectly, through merger, consolidation or acquisition, acquire
control or a majority of the assets of any other person if
(1) such other person has total assets of $100 million or more, and
(2) in the case of an acquisition of a majority of the assets, $100
million or more of assets would be acquired.
(b) No acquisition shall be prohibited by this section if the likely effect
of the acquisition would be substantially to enhance competition in the domestic or foreign commerce of the United States.
(c) For purposes of this section(1) A "major producer" is any person incorporated in the United
States who, together with the persons it controls, produced an average of
150,000 barrels or more per day world-wide of crude oil and natural gas
liquids in the immediately preceding calendar year. Production of crude
oil and natural gas liquids shall include interests in such production.
(2) An "affiliate" of a major producer is a person who entrls; is
oi-ontro1-wih-, such major producer.
controlled by-or--i.umdei-.+o
(3) The total assets of a person shall include those of all persons
controlled by such person.
(4) Assets acquired within a period of three years shall be presumed to
be the subject of a single acquisition.
(5) Control means having the power, directly or indirectly, to direct or
cause the direction of the management and policies of a person through
the ownership of voting securities or otherwise; provided, however, that
control shall not arise solely out of a bona fide credit transaction. Ownership of, or the power to vote, 15 percent or more of the outstanding
voting securities of a person creates a rebuttable presumption of control.
Ownership of, or the power to vote, less than 15 percent of the outstanding voting securities of a person does not create a presumption of control
or lack of control.
(6) "United States" includes the several States, the territories, possessions and commonwealths of the United States and the District of
Columbia.
(7) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph,
the value of assets is the amount at which such assets are carried on
the books used as the basis for reports filed by a person pursuant to
Section 13 or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or
which would be used if Section 13 or Section 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 were applicable to require reporting by such
person.
(B) In the case of acquisition of less than all of the assets of a person,
in determining whether a majority of person's assets would be acquired, the value of assets is the fair market value.
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(d) (1) Nothing contained herein shall be construed to prohibit any
acquisition involving solely persons controlling, controlled by, or under
common control with one another.
(2) Nothing contained herein shall be construed to render unlawful
any acquisition on the basis of increases in production or assets after
consummation.
(e) (1) For purposes of sections 4 and 16 of this Act, this section shall
not be considered part of the antitrust laws.
(2) In any action to enforce this section, whenever a challenged acquisition has been or may be consummated, the court shall, upon petition, issue an order appropriate to ensure that the assets and operations
of the parties to the acquisition are kept intact and held separate and
that the parties do not interfere with or participate in the management or
internal affairs of one another pending final adjudication. This paragraph shall not be construed to affect in any way any determination as to
the need for or propriety of a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction enjoining consummation of any acquisition which may be
prohibited by the section.
(f) Nothing contained herein shall be construed to provide any defense
or immunity to any acquisition which would violate Section 7 of this Act or
otherwise be unlawful.
(g) This section shall apply to acquisitions consummated after June 1,
1979 and prior to January 1, 1991.

